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Abstract 
 
The focal point of this essay aims to challenge the dominant accounts for the origins of 
insecurity in the Third World, which have mostly rested upon the contingent effects of the 
external factor, particularly the end of the Cold War. By emphasizing the importance of both 
external and internal sources of insecurity alike, the essay suggests two fronts of linking the 
internal and the external in order to depict the whole shape of insecurity that failed states 
face. The two linkage solutions include (1) the promotion of democratic, economic, and 
institutional capacities; and (2) the proactive consideration of local conditions and cultural 
differences, all of which external interventions need to pay more attention to when they 
proceed in the targeted countries. 
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Take up the White Man’s burden –  
The savage wars of peace –  
Fill full the mouth of Famine, 
And bid the sickness cease. 
(Rudyard Kipling, The Works of Rudyard Kipling, 1994) 
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Introduction 
 
Eric J. Hobsbawm (1994: 4) in his seminal book The Age of Extremes presents the prospect for 
the 21st century world system with his keen insight that the collapse of the Cold War system 
triggered a massive flow of “political uncertainty, instability, chaos and civil war” in zones of 
the Third World, particularly former communist regimes. The reshuffling global order in the 
post-Cold War era destroyed the old mechanism contributing to stabilizing the bipolar system 
of international relations for the four decades, and brought to the fore the shakiness of the 
domestic political statehood in the Third World which had rested on the structural stability 
under the Cold War system.2 Indeed, the breakdown of the Cold War system, as many 
scholars emphasize, generated a critical cut-off point in which the latent sources of conflicts in 
the Third World emerged from ethnic cleansing, religious separation, extreme right-wing 
nationalism, and the rampant terrorism across state borders (Mueller 2000; MacFarlane 2000; 
Rapley 2002). In short, it can be fair to conclude that the external variable of ‘the end of the 
Cold War’ is the most decisive factor to explain the sources and origins of insecurities in Third 
World societies.  
 However, such a single external impact itself does not suffice to describe a sea change 
in the historical social system forming the internal sources of conflicts and disorders in the 
post-Cold War Third World. The transformation of the power balance in the international 
society would not become a self-evident factor without a complementary course of action to 
                                                  
2 Definition of the concept, the Third World, has always been problematic and slippery. Some 
scholars argue that the concept, in the period of the post-Cold War, is not relevant any longer as a 
useful category for analysis on the geographical area outside Western Europe and North America, 
thus suggesting the disuse of the concept (Ravenhill 1990; Goldgeiser and McFaul 1992). As 
replacements of the Third World, numerous alternatives have been proposed to tag this group of 
states – for instance, the South, the Periphery, and the Developing countries. Geographically 
speaking, however, any terms other than the Third World fail to cover the traditional cluster of 
states across Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America in a comprehensive manner. Some 
states which can be categorized as the Third World are located in the ‘northern’ areas of the globe. 
Some of Southeast Asian countries which have experienced the rapid economic growth are hardly 
named as the peripheral states; probably, at least, they should fall on the zone of the ‘semi-
periphery’. Most Third World countries have also been far behind developing countries like South 
Korea and Taiwan, so that they need to be classified as a new term ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘less 
developed’ countries. All in all, given that the process of conventional conflicts has never been 
complete even in the post-Cold War era and they are still popping up in the areas classified 
traditionally as the Third World, the old term ‘Third World’ is adopted as the main concept 
describing a group of states which will be investigated in this essay.   
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investigate its interconnectedness to internal causes of local disputes embedded in a given 
historical condition of Third World states. As John A. Hall (1996: xii) aptly criticizes, the 
spectacular US/UN victory in the Gulf War, which has been highlighted as a good example of 
external contingencies restructuring domestic orders in postwar Iraq, was ironically discolored 
by widespread and escalating ethnic violence rooted in distinctive localities of the Iraqi 
religious and cultural institutions. Thus, understanding the social embeddedness of internal 
dynamics in the Third World is a necessary condition to represent an entire picture of 
insecurities that Third World societies have faced in the aftermath of the Cold War.    
 In this regard, this essay will tackle a fundamental question on security issues of the 
Third World in the post-Cold War period: where the main sources of insecurity in the Third 
World originate from – internal instability in the historical social system or the external 
transformation of the modern world system. By bringing together those two different subjects 
that have hitherto been examined separately, the essay rests on an alternative approach to 
weigh internal sources against outer changes in the external systems. To this end, the 
discussion proceeds in three steps. The first part touches upon the question whether the end 
of the Cold War increased or dampened instability and conflicts in the Third World. Secondly, 
external and internal dimensions for Third World conflicts are listed and assessed in a brief 
manner. Thirdly, it is suggested that a better frame to analyze the origins of bloody turmoil in 
the Third World is to filter external impacts through the prism of internal dimensions and 
integrate the internal and external into a more constructive frame for analysis. 
 
The Cold War Stability Thesis Revisited 
Some academic scholars or policymakers in the realist context like to view the end of the Cold 
War as the major cause of developing countries’ conflicts, primarily in the sense that the 
bipolar distribution of power during the Cold War era mostly contributed to mitigating 
conflicts in the Third World (Waltz 1979; Neuman 1998; Kalu 2001). The bipolar Cold War 
system played an important role in hushing up the tinderboxes of Third World conflicts at the 
inter- or intra-state level by making ideological propaganda aiming at the effective 
management of both US-led capitalist bloc and USSR-led communist bloc. Military and 
economic aids among allies had been utilized as a strategic apparatus for leading states in 
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each bloc to maintain peaceful coexistence of secondary states within the blocs and prevent 
them from bandwagoning (Walt 1987). In a similar vein, the world system theorists concur 
with this realist assessment by noting that power shifts in world hegemony created the 
political vacuum of global governance, which led security issues of the Third World in systemic 
crisis and brought about turbulence and chaos in world politics (Wallerstein 1995: 268; Silver 
and Slater 1999). The core value of the Cold War stability thesis, therefore, easily jumps to the 
conclusion that the main sources of insecurity in Third World countries are formed primarily 
by the transformation of external systems after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
 However, it is obviously premature to assume that the fundamental dynamics of 
Third World conflicts have been changed in the wake of the end of the Cold War, and the 
resultant tensions among Third World states have been much more highly exacerbated. This 
assumption considering the one-sided dimension of Third World insecurities in the post-Cold 
War period is doomed to encounter the following flaws. Firstly, superpower rivalries during 
the Cold War made Third World conflicts even worse by presenting the external sources of 
political, military, and economic support to regional disputants, by which prompted local 
proxies to take on more hostile postures and make longer local conflicts with the equipment of 
ideological fillip (Loup 1983; MacFarlane 1985; Ayoob 1995). In other words, local conflicts in 
the Third World had been used as proxy wars steered by two superpowers of the United States 
and the Soviet Union in order to test each superpower’s political intentions and strategic 
purposes in the areas where each side’s interest was extremely confronted. In cases of the 
1950 Korean War and the 1965 Vietnam War, we now know that both civil wars in the Cold 
War period can be defined as proxy wars mobilized and controlled by superpowers for the sake 
of test cases for American resolve to withstand communist offensive in East Asia (Cumings 
1990; Khong 1992). We now also know such hot wars devastated people and lands of proxy 
states so severely that the alleged virtue of the Cold War stability thesis can be rightly 
negated.  
 Secondly, it is worthy to note that the rising disarrays in Third World societies are 
deep-rooted in not only immediate repercussions of the demise of the Cold War but also the 
recurring outgrowth of longstanding historical shackles which the European powers during 
the imperial heyday implanted into the rest of the globe in the form of the system of national 
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states. Just as European empires, prior to the outbreak of the two World Wars, forced local 
authorities in the peripheral zones to adopt the Westphalian model of statehood without full 
consideration of native peculiarities under the rosy name of the Enlightenment, so the two 
superpowers – the US and the USSR – during the Cold War period, by way of decolonization 
and the alliance formation, coerced the newly-born states into demarcating their territorial 
boundaries and consolidating their political systems along with ideological frontlines imposed 
by the Cold War rivalry. In a nutshell, the expansion of international society, which proceeded 
with the ignorance of ethnic, religious and cultural differences in Third World societies, has 
inevitably been accompanied with chronic insecurities of the Third World throughout the 20th 
century (Watson 1984; Vincent 1986). The seeds of discontents in the post-Cold War Third 
World, therefore, result from the unrelenting expansion of international society since the 
epoch of imperial colonization, rather than a simple external contingency of the collapse of 
communism.  
 As a final point, such a notion of the international society paradigm requires us to 
reconsider the Cold War stability thesis and pay more attention to the internal dimension of 
insecurity sources in the Third World (e.g. Bull 1977). Against the imposed process of the 
territorial demarcation, various ethnic or religious groups right after the end of World War II 
began to claim their own rights of ‘self-determination’ in the wake of decolonization, which 
was ironically instilled by the former imperial states. Likewise, the post-Cold War epoch was 
also characterized by the upsurge of independent voices for establishing ethnic self-
governments in the region of the former communist countries. The common aspect of these 
two historical phenomena – the end of both World War II and the Cold War – endorses the 
persistent existence of internal causes for the Third World insecurity whilst external 
conditions, in marked contrast, had been undergoing the roller-coaster moves in the rise and 
fall of the power structure at a given international system (Abu-Lughod 1993). The upshot is 
that the incidence of internal conflicts has been constant, no matter how the external shield to 
maintain international order and neutralize the latent sources of Third World crises has been 
varying over time.   
 The importance of internal factors notwithstanding, it would not be a qualified 
conclusion that external factors do not have any important impacts on the emergence of 
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insecurity in the post-Cold War Third World. The worthy role of external dimensions should be 
well counted as one of key triggering sources by which the latent conflicts in the Third World 
began to awake from long sleep, even if they are not sufficient accounts for the sources of 
insecurity. All in all, we need to regard both internal and external dimensions as the main 
sources of insecurity despite the variation of relative weights across them, and further 
attention needs to be given to the interconnectedness between the two dimensions. The 
subsequent sections will look through them one by one with selected issues.  
 
External Dimensions 
An essential source of insecurity in Third World societies has been forcibly structured by the 
external world system and its impacts on sovereign governance in domestic politics. Some new 
outer pressures which are locking the Third World into insecurity in the post-Cold War period 
can be classified as the following three fronts in world politics. 
 
The Unipolar Transformation of the Power Structure 
One of remarkable changes in external dimensions comes from the fact that international 
system in the post-Cold War era is not run by bipolar confrontation any longer; instead, a few 
plausible scenarios such as the unipolar system and a concert of the great powers are 
suggested as its replacement. The current transformation of world order demonstrates that 
the United States is the only major power with the will and the military capabilities to 
perform the role of policeman for the Third World. Nor does any agreement exist on who, if not 
the United States, has the leverage, influence, and money to bring the kind of pressure that 
produces positive results on security issues of developing countries (Ruggie 1994; Wohlforth 
1999).3   
As a result, Third World countries which want to be protected from the internal 
conflicts by invoking the superpower’s engagement become more dependent on American 
strategic interests and foreign policies than they did during the Cold War era (Acharya 2000: 
97). Otherwise, weak or failed states in the Third World are more likely to take an extreme 
                                                  
3 As regards the further debates, particularly argument criticizing the stability of the unipolar 
system in the post-Cold War period, refer to Christopher Layne (2006).  
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measure to challenge America’s unilateral ventures by procuring or producing weapons and 
even nuclear weapons, all of which aim at guarding state sovereignty against US-led 
interferences. As is well known, we can witness clearly such a radical challenge in the cases of 
North Korea’s nuclear development when the Bush administration accused North Korea of 
one of rogue states and the Iranian pursuit for nuclear weapons after Hussein-led Iraq was 
tumbled down by the United States. The emergence of global terrorism, whose conception has 
been popularized after the September 11 attacks, could be also interpreted in the similar 
context as the far most extreme counterblow made by the Third World. Indeed, the retreat of 
the bipolar protection and the advent of the one-power domination in world politics drive the 
dependent Third World to choose its way on whether or not it will be aligned with the US 
grand strategy. Namely, going with America is good and right; if not, it will be deemed unjust. 
Such an enforced discrimination between right and wrong, however, eventually boils down to 
the undesirable result of situating Third World states on even more mired impasse regardless 
of their original intentions.  
 
Humanitarian Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention, despite its enlightened rationale for minimizing the suffering of 
civilians in Third World states, could turn easily into another external sources undermining 
domestic security of its targeted countries. Given that the missions of humanitarian 
intervention are selected and spearheaded mostly in accordance with strategic concerns of the 
United States and other leading powers, manipulating the processes of the target selection 
comes up with detrimental interventions which can be rather escalating the magnitude of 
insecurity and vulnerability in Third World societies. It is primarily due to the lack of 
consideration on domestic conditions of the targeted countries, which would thereby result in 
reducing the effectiveness of humanitarian interference (Wheeler 2000).  
However, Third World concerns about the growing frequency of international 
intervention in conflicts, particularly intra-state turmoil, surpass the apprehension that such 
intervention may be launched to serve the political goals of one or more of the great powers. 
James Mayall (1996: 6) asserts that the concerns are fundamentally entrenched in tensions 
between the UN- or the U.S.-led humanitarian intervention vis-à-vis internal conflicts and the 
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cardinal rule of the international society of states – the equal sovereignty. Armed interference 
with humanitarian objectives has been justified by the elastic interpretation of the Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter in the face of the Third World’s condemnation that the 
great powers and intergovernmental agencies, under the superficially attractive slogan of 
‘humanitarianism’, have been violating the United Nations Charter’s principle of 
noninterference in the exclusive right and domestic jurisdiction of an individual state (Jonah 
1993). As a result, the external inputs of humanitarian intervention are more likely to create 
internal turbulent outputs mobilizing and militarizing social forces against foreign agencies, 
particularly United Nations peacekeepers. The UN-led peacekeeping mission in Sudan’s 
Darfur region in recent years demonstrates evidently that foreign troops dispatched to halt 
the Darfur genocide have frequently encountered severe physical threats, even attacks to kill 
United Nations peacekeepers, from local insurgents.  
Moreover, another negative effect of the external intervention in Third World politics 
arises from the notion that the excessive intervention of external forces in domestic conflicts 
would hamper the targeted states to initiate and consolidate the state building process, 
thereby destabilizing the legitimate authorities of political regimes and generating anti-
government movements calling for civil wars in the end. Now that humanitarian engagement 
per se would be easily galvanized and overdone when foreign actors see any possibilities of 
geopolitical, economic, and resource-based significances in the targeted countries, Western 
efforts to help the world’s most dangerous and desperate countries, as William Easterly 
criticizes, become the ‘white man’s burden’ for his own deed (Easterly 2006). It is in the sense 
that such efforts do seldom succeed in reducing insecurity and conflicts in the domestic arena 
of the Third World so that they bring about a boomerang effect requiring further more 
international intervention as a solution to diminish the humanitarian backfire. 
 
Securitizing International Politics 
The final category of external sources involves a new trend of redefining the concept of 
security in international relations. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the coverage of 
security has been increasingly broadened from the military-based traditional conception into 
economic, political, societal, and environmental versions of security dimensions (Buzan 1991; 
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Katzenstein 1996; Buzan et al. 1998). As regards the unit of analysis in security studies, non-
state actors have been also highlighted as the referent of security, with a variety of linkages 
and tensions between the unitary entity of nation states and multifaceted non-state entities. 
This new approach to international security contributes to blurring the conventional borders 
which has been clearly drawn between domestic agendas and international issues.  
However, the danger on this stretched concept of security is that all things could be 
considered threat to security if one perceives them as the potential sources of insecurity, and 
would-be threats, thereby, could be securitized by one’s strategic intention or ill will. Given 
that the process of securitization is more likely to be undergone beyond the boundary of 
political procedure within the internal mechanism of a state, new security agendas open to 
any issues beyond the traditional ones can be imposed on Third World states by leading 
powers and intergovernmental organizations. Following the discourse of securitization, once a 
certain issue is set up as an urgent security agenda endorsed widely by the international 
community, a series of extraordinary measures to tighten up the development of securitization 
would be claimed by the great powers in order to make secondary states accommodating 
themselves to such a new concept of security. Indiscrete securitization, thus, would throw 
unfavorable drawbacks to Third World countries which are not well ready to respond to 
economic, societal, and even environmental care taking for their constituencies or still have 
trouble with ethnic, religious and tribal conflicts. For instance, Western powers’ thrust to link 
trade with international labor standards (Blue Round) or environmental standards (Green 
Round) results in aggravating the Third World’s insecurity as Third World states have no 
sound governments and civil societies to deal with such external pressures aiming to carry 
through new security agendas. Indeed, they are severely exposed to securitization on those 
issues of labor and eco-friendly business, all of which are designed and implemented by 
external actors. In consequence, international efforts to broaden the concept of security 
following the end of the Cold War, paradoxically, end up with the broadened range and density 
of insecurities in Third World states. 
 
Internal Dimensions 
External dimensions of insecurity in the Third World become much more complicated if they 
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face the internal sources of Third World conflicts. As Mohammed Ayoob (1995: 165) 
demonstrates, the problematic factors of insecurity in the dimension of internal aspects are, 
by and large, divided into two categories: (1) increasing legitimacy accorded to ethnic 
nationalism by the international community; and (2) the increasing incidence of failed states. 
These two internal factors, which are frequently interrelated, have emerged as the major post-
Cold War challenges to security and integrity of Third World states. 
 
Ethnic Self-Determination 
Along with the end of the Cold War, the renewed acceptance of ethno-national self-
determination by the major European powers and the United Nations, symbolized by the 
prompt recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the European Union, the separation of Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic, and the division of the former Yugoslavia into three ethnic nation-
states, is likely to give a fillip to demands for ethnic separation in the Third World. The 
international community’s endorsement of the self-determination doctrine on the ground of 
ethnic nationalism is bound to pose warnings against the existing principle of international 
society – territorial boundaries among states must be inviolable. Given the ethnic mixtures of 
populations in most Third World countries and the fact that few pure ethnic nation-states 
exist, it would be fair to state that the separation movements or attempts for territorial 
restoration under the sensitive rhetoric of ethnic self-determination encounter drastic 
resistance from ethnic minorities in presumed ethnic homelands. Looking at the inherent 
nature of ethnic self-determination, common ethnicity does not create social cohesion or 
communitarian accord so that nationalist regimes are necessarily impelled to maintain unity 
by force rather than by consent (Ignatieff 1994: 1-11). This is the main reason why ethnic 
nationalist regimes are more authoritarian than democratic.  
In reality, new nations such as Serbia and Croatia, the Baltic States, and the new 
Asian republics, have institutionalized ethnic majority domination in ruling authorities, 
rather than democratic governance on top of the respect for ethnic minorities. Particularly, 
ethnic nationalism has been flourishing in Eastern Europe because forty years of communist 
single-party rule effectively destroyed civility and democratic culture which once had been in 
the region. When the Soviet empire and its satellite regimes collapsed, the nation state 
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structures of the region also collapse, leaving hundreds of ethnic groups at the mercy of each 
other; since none of these groups had the slightest experience of conciliating their 
disagreements by democratic discussion, violence or force primarily resting on ‘their own blood 
and belongs’ became their arbiter (Halperin et al. 1992; Ignatieff 1994). This brings to us a 
working proposition that ethnic nationalism does not anchor its roots in societies with 
extensive democratic values and traditions. In this context, new states reach an impasse on 
their security matters: while they carved out in the name of ethnic nations, the ethnic 
mixtures of populations would be always an explosive warehouse addressing the contradiction 
between their claims to ethnic nationalism and the substantive existence of the other ethnic 
minorities. In addition, these new states have not experienced in managing ethnic conflicts by 
adopting democratic conciliations. Accordingly, the linkage between the doctrine of malleable 
self-determination and the metamorphosis of ethnicity causes Third World countries to be 
more vulnerable to the internal insecurity predicament. 
 
Failed States: The Lack of Institutional Capacity 
The second internal origins of insecurity in the Third World, as Francis Fukuyama (2004: 23-
32) elaborates, can be found in the corrosion or breakdown of institutional infrastructures.4 
Shaky foundations of institutional framework would necessarily provoke the deterioration of 
state governance, thus paralyzing a complex set of institutional constraints including the 
formal and legitimate rules nested in the hierarchy of social order (North 1990: 83). In fact, 
the invocation of ethnic self-determination has been closely interconnected with the 
breakdown of institutional apparatuses designed for state governance in Third World 
countries. Ethnic nationalism becomes far more rampant when institutions collapse – more 
specifically, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people’s basic needs and satisfactory 
alternative structures are not readily available (Snyder 1993: 5). The presence of 
malfunctioned statehood calls for the rebirth of ethnic atrocities that could provide ethnic 
groups with a new institution characterized by the ethnic discrimination and majority 
predomination, and in doing so, the ethno-centric politics can give ethnic groups the belief of 
                                                  
4 According to Fukuyama (2004: 23-32), institutional capacity consists of four nested aspects of 
stateness: (1) organizational and management, (2) political system design, (3) basis of 
legitimization, and (4) cultural and structural factors.  
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security.  
In this regard, Robert Jackson (1990: 13) asserts that the failure of consolidating state 
institutions in a robust and effective fashion takes responsible for the emergence of ‘quasi-
states’ in the Third World. A mixed chain of external and internal events – the end of the Cold 
War, its entailing disappearance of ideological, political, and economic shields from 
superpowers, and more importantly, the prevalence of ethnic self-nationalism in domestic 
arenas of the Third World – has been catalyzing the process of transformation of quasi-states 
into even more worsening configuration of the so-called ‘failed states’. Despite the ongoing 
controversy over the declaration whether or not a state has ‘failed’, a failed state, whose 
central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its 
territory, is obviously deemed as the internal sources of insecurity in the Third World.5  
It is of great importance to note that the most central component in the emergence of 
failed states corresponds to the extent of how fragile and ineffective the basic institutional 
arrangements to protect people from dangers of everyday life as well as external threats are 
(World Bank 1994). The difficulties of failed states, therefore, vary considerably in accordance 
with the degree of institutional capacity that Third World regimes can marshal to maintain 
social order. The contemporary Iraq’s social unrest after the Second Gulf War could be 
interpreted in line with such institutional difficulties, in that the low profile of institutional 
capacity in postwar Iraqi government failed to control internal disputes and neutralize 
assertive demands for religious differences in the process of state building. As a result, the 
weak governance of the Iraqi new political regime resulted in dragging the US military 
presence in the Iraqi territory, even though Washington has always been pressed by the hot 
debate over when American troops should be retreated from Iraq. All in all, the prevalence of 
insecurity caused by internal weaknesses of institutional capacity is necessarily bound to 
incur the intervention of external forces and even the prolongation of their stationing.  
 
                                                  
5 With regard to the debate over the concept of failed states, the extremely radical stance toward 
its definition can be found in Noam Chomsky’s recent book Failed States (2006). In this book, 
Chomsky argues that the United States is becoming a ‘failed state’ so that the current pattern of 
governance in the United States would be perceived as a danger by both its own people and the 
world. 
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Linking the Internal and the External 
As seen in the foregoing section, both internal and external dimensions of insecurity in the 
Third World are so profoundly interpenetrated that internal instability, as a result of ethnic 
nationalism or fragile governance, called outside interference such as humanitarian 
intervention, on the one hand, and external contingencies stemming from the collapse of the 
Cold War brought about the upsurge of ethnic conflicts in the Third World, on the other. Any 
single approaches to insecurity of the Third World would be dashed to the ground because 
they have seldom been qualified to show the whole picture of the origins of insecurity in the 
post-Cold War period. Without a comprehensive approach to integrate two dimensions in a 
symbiotic shape, any sequential explanations from the external to the internal (or vice versa) 
would produce no more than an ex post facto report on what has already happened in Third 
World conflicts. A vicious cycle of insecurity in the Third World, therefore, is unrelenting with 
the effect of enlarging the divergence in economic and democratic development in different 
regions. Alternatively, more attention should be given to how to bridge internal and external 
dimensions for better solutions to deal with Third World problems in a more systematic way. 
In this essay, two conceivable ways to link them together are suggested as policy prescriptions. 
 
Maximizing Governability 
First of all, all external commitments – humanitarian intervention or international aid – are 
required to prepare the following three elements in association with the governability of the 
targeted states: (1) the establishment of democratic governance; (2) the promotion of economic 
development; and (3) the enhancement of institutional capacity to strengthen the two 
preceding elements. The establishment and consolidation of democratic governance are 
necessary conditions to reduce the incidence of ethnic and religious turmoil in Third World 
societies. In the post-Cold War era, making democracy work and finding a democratic means 
through which outsiders can help remain a high priority in the terrain of humanitarian 
commitments for poverty-stricken Third World states. Western policymakers use various 
methods to spur the targeted countries toward democracy, from economic sanctions to the 
force of arms. Their most common and effective tool, however, is democracy assistance – aid 
programs explicitly designed to bolster democratic institutions, processes, and principles  
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Table 1. Ten Worst Per capita Growth rates in the Third World (1980-2002) 
Country  
Freedom 
indicator*  
Per capita 
growth (%) 
Aid/GDP (%)
UN 
peacekeeping 
operations** 
Time under 
IMF program 
(%) 
Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of 
6.50 -5.0 4.69 
MONUC 
(1999) 
39 
Côte d’Ivoire 6.14 -1.9 5.60 
UNOCI 
(2004) 
74 
Haiti 6.00 -2.6 9.41 
MINUSTAH 
(2004) 
55 
Liberia 5.95 -3.9 11.94 
UNMIL 
(2003) 
22 
Madagascar  3.74 -1.9 10.78 - 71 
Niger 6.01 -1.7 13.15 - 63 
Nigeria 5.36 -1.6 0.59 - 20 
Sierra Leone 5.41 -5.8 15.37 
UNIOSIL 
(2006) 
50 
Togo 6.36 -1.8 11.18 - 72 
Zambia 4.77 -1.8 19.98 - 53 
Median  5.98 -1.9 10.98 - 54 
Sources: Easterly (2006: 347), Freedom House (2008), and United Nations (2008).  
* The freedom indicator refers to 2008 Freedom in the World 
(www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAIIScores.xls). The ratings process of Freedom in 
the World is based on a checklist of political rights and civil liberties. Political rights consist 
of the three sub-categories: Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, and 
Functioning of Government. The civil liberties questions are grouped into four sub-
categories: Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule 
of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. 
** Data on UN peacekeeping operations refer to the UN official website 
(www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf).  
 
(Carothers 1999). Democratic institutions, once established, contribute to slowing down ethnic 
conflicts by filtering them through democratic processes to find a way of narrowing widened 
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gaps between different ethnic groups. In actual fact, ten Third World countries, whose median 
freedom indicator is 5.98 (see table 1), have been, for more than two decades, mired in 
nondemocratic dictatorships imposing restraints on political freedom and civic participations 
in social movements against governments’ corruption and electoral frauds. The lack of the 
democratic rule necessarily ruined the possibility of mutual concession through peaceful 
dialogues, so that the existing political order was always challenged and disturbed by internal 
violence and conflicts. Such an internal instability is more likely to invite external forces as 
surrogates for domestic authorities to repair political vacuum and humanitarian disasters, as 
table 1 confirms that five out of ten failed states have been under the humanitarian protection 
of UN peacekeeping operations. In a nutshell, the even further weakening of governability in 
the Third World would be unavoidable unless humanitarian intervention or foreign aid is 
explicitly connected with the conditionality that the recipient government should ensure 
democratic reforms in return for outer assistance from the international community? (Killick 
et al. 1998). 
Likewise, linking international aid with developmental projects tailored for domestic 
economies of the Third World is also considered one of critical methods to enhance the 
governability, since the revitalization of the retarded economies, in part or in full scale, leads 
ethnic or other untamed groups to cooperate with the government. Until the mid-1980s, the 
primary response of the aid community to conflicts in Third World states was to provide 
emergency assistance designed as a palliative for the humanitarian crises. In the post-Cold 
War period, however, a new orthodoxy emerged that humanitarian aid could play a significant 
role in the management of conflict by adopting developmental principles and approaches in a 
longer term of the recipient economies (Duffield 1994; Macrae 2001). The ten worst failed 
states in the domain of economic growth rates show negative 1.9 percentage of per capita 
growth on a median average, and international aid provided for them consumes at a median 
average rate of 10.98 percent of GDP (see table 1). More strikingly, table 1 also illustrates that 
the median time assigned to supervise those failed states in Africa and Asia under the IMF 
programs is no less than 54 percent of 23 years – namely, 12.4 years between 1980 and 2002 – 
with some variation from 16.6 years for Togo to 4.6 years for Nigeria. It signifies that economic 
assistance programs prescribed by the IMF have not made positive effects on the real path of 
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economic development in local economies of failed states, or the IMF programs would be 
unilaterally imposed on the recipient countries without due reflection of local conditions 
(Stiglitz 2002). The pivotal point here we can envisage is that the better way to maximize the 
efficacy of external aid programs would be to marry international aid to some specific and 
long-term development projects designed to vitalize economic infrastructure on the basis of 
local conditions; otherwise, external interventions would undermine the governability of local 
authorities, extending internal instability to an unlimited extent.  
Finally, the first two patterns of external-internal links – democratic governance and economic 
development – can get on the right track only under the third condition that they should be 
accompanied with the rich soil of institutional apparatuses in the new born regimes. The 
poverty of transparent and sound institutions to deal with external interferences is directly 
related to institutional failures in enhancing the effectiveness of external aid programs by 
either democratic reforms or development projects. Maximizing the governability, therefore, 
depends upon the degree of the institutional control over politics in Third World societies 
(Ringen 1987: 70-75). According to World Bank reports (see figure 1), in countries with good 
macroeconomic management and efficient public institutions, donor-financed projects were 86 
percent successful, with much higher rates of return. Conversely, in failed states with weak 
policies and institutions, the corresponding figure is a measly 48 percent. These findings 
highlight that the most critical contribution of World Bank-initiated projects is not to increase 
just funding for particular recipient countries, but to help improve service delivery by 
strengthening sectoral and public institutions. In this sense, the World Bank (1998: 3) 
calibrates the value of its aid projects to development projects aiming to strengthen the overall?
quality of institutions and policies in the recipient country. Making institutional capacity 
strong and efficient, therefore, is at the core of external-internal links, as well as the 
fundamental foundation for promoting democratic reforms and economic developments in the 
Third World. In short, the integrative efforts to diminish internal insecurity by means of the 
utilization of external aid should begin with the reinforcement of institutional infrastructures 
where democratic governance and economic growth projects can, then, be positively engrafted 
on local actors suffering failed stateness. 
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Figure 1. Project Performance by Policy and Institutional Environment 
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 Sources: World Bank (1997). 
 
Minimizing Differences 
The governability could be further more maximized when the external-internal linkage adopts 
the second element of minimizing cultural differences by the proactive consideration of local 
peculiarities. Borrowing Mark Granovetter’s notion of ‘social embeddedness’ (1985), we can 
analogize that internal sources of insecurity in failed states are embedded in the context of 
institutional capacities, which are also affected by historical contingencies in which they are 
set. In this sociological sense, a Third World country’s cultural and historical conditions – 
particularly, ethnic, religious, or tribal circumstances – may profoundly affect the character of 
external-internal insecurity relations by either encouraging or discouraging domestic actors’ 
cooperation with external intervention. Formal schemes of democratic order or economic 
reform plans imposed by external agencies are untenable without some elements of the 
practical knowledge on the local scene that they tend to dismiss. When ignoring essential 
features of any real, functioning social values in the targeted country, certain kinds of external 
interferences, driven by the utopian humanitarianism or strategic objectives, would be a 
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mortal threat to human well-being in the Third World (Scott 1998). Thus, more desirable 
strategy of external-internal links is to promote home-based development embedded in the 
local, the traditional, and the customary, rather than prearranged plans rooted in Western 
experiences of modernization (Easterly 2006: 341). By doing so, external actors like 
international relief agencies, also, can tighten the grip of conditionalities by successful 
cooptation of some powerful groups representing indigenous values and cultures.  
In practice, the correspondents in the Third World to the call for cultural cooperation 
from external actors are mostly identified with public institutions administered by local 
governments. However, given that most governments in the Third World have been 
undergoing the spread of corruptions in managing public institutions, civil society is fast 
becoming one of dominant alternatives replacing the tainted government (Bickford 1995; 
White 1995). In the 1990s, many intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, 
IMF, and UNDP seemed to pay more attention to linking aid projects with reliable internal 
actors through civil society in order to reduce the cultural differences and enhance the 
effectiveness of aid programs. The amount of money allocated to strengthening civil society is 
very small against the backdrop of aid; civil society organizations (CSOs) play an important 
role in promoting social justice that is culturally modified by the reflection of actual localities. 
Accordingly, external-internal links through CSOs present the lure of emancipatory promise 
that civil society is used to mean all good things in all places and at all times (Kumar 1993). 
Nevertheless, many scholars warn that the flood of Western funds for such organizations has 
produced too much or too wrong kinds of growth (Van Rooy 1998: 198-205). Financial 
shakiness is more likely to generate corruptions within CSOs; amateurish staffs in CSOs are 
not qualified to secure the sustainability of aid projects; and the lack of policy consistence 
results in decreasing accountability. Such a downside of the CSO-based external-internal 
nexus leads the ‘going local’ trend to be reconsidered and the benevolent Tocquevillean vision 
is required to revise itself by adopting a new device to orchestrate local CSOs in line with 
donors’ aid plans. It is in this regard that ‘civic education’ programs have been a mandatory 
element of US democracy aid portfolios worldwide over the past fifteen years (Carothers 1999: 
231). Indeed, the idea of teaching citizens of the Third World basic values, knowledge, and 
skills relating to democracy is a logical outgrowth of the proactive recognition of civil society 
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as a key partner who can work together to minimize differences between external agencies 
and internal actors.  
 
By Way of Conclusion 
On the one hand, the most extreme view, in the camp of proponents of the external sources, 
presents Gramsci’s hegemonic insights applied to insecurity in the Third World, which mean 
that after the collapse of the Cold War only the Third World remains a highly visible target of 
American force in order to reconstruct American supremacy, whereas during the Cold War 
period any alliance members in capitalist bloc became the target of force from American 
hegemony (Augelli and Murphy 1993: 133). On the other, the very opposite excessiveness 
emerges from the viewpoint of internal insecurity: historical inequalities in the design of 
colonial institutions, even since the fifteenth century, constitute the most important source of 
current disparities in living standards across countries in the Third World (Acemoglu et al. 
2001). Dialectically, the common element of two extremities stems from the notion that “the 
Third World is an identity based on a perception of peripheralization and victimization” 
(MacFarlane 2000: 19).  
With this three-pronged fronts Third World countries face in the post-Cold War period, 
this essay is an academic effort to construct the fabric of the external-internal nexus as a 
middle-range solution for the sources of insecurity in the Third World. By deconstructing the 
analytical wall standing between external and internal approaches to the Third World 
insecurity, the essay suggests two possible scenarios of integrating the two dimensions: 
maximizing governability on the basis of democratic governance, economic development, and 
institutional capacity; and minimizing cultural differences by inviting local CSOs as key 
partners. Particularly, domestic factors such as ethnic self-determination, failed statecrafts, 
and the utility of civil society are highlighted as a critical platform on which the external 
dimension that we have long regarded as the main sources of insecurity in Third World 
countries could be reinterpreted and reproduced. Characteristically, we now know at least that 
the end of the Cold War is just one of important factors, not a sole structure revealing the 
whole sources of insecurity in Third World states.  
As a final remark, the tasks ahead are fairly suggested: academic efforts to integrate 
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Third World studies into development studies are essentially requested. Taking into 
consideration the Third World’s failed stateness in many aspects, the discourse of external-
internal links should provide further discussion about how to rebuild up the sound statehood 
through the constructive cooperation between external aid agencies and internal institutions. 
It should go beyond the nonproductive debate over the origins of the Third World. This is also 
the best way to reduce or terminate white man’s burden whose ending is seldom anticipated in 
due course of time.  
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